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The paradoxical goal of much of animal-based biomedical
research is to model severe human injuries and illnesses without
causing severe pain or distress to the animals. Current public
policy in most countries calls for treatment or prevention of
laboratory animal pain whenever possible. However, the ‘‘when-
ever possible’’ provision allows for some intentional infliction of
untreated pain in laboratory animals when doing otherwise would
be expected to disrupt the experiment. Permission to withhold
painkillers when their use would interfere with the experiment is
codified in public policy, as in the United States Department of
Agriculture’s 1971 designation of ‘‘Category E’’ painful proce-
dures. Determining which experiments may permissibly cause
pain and distress in laboratory animals, and deciding how that
pain may be minimized or managed, requires clear ethical
reasoning as well as the best available knowledge of animal biology
and behavior. This article explores some of the common reasons
why some laboratory animals may not receive pain medicines, and
discusses some proposals for increasing use of pain medications for
them. The policy focus is on the American system, though the
general themes apply equally to other countries’ laboratory animal
welfare rules.
Introduction
Can it ever be ethical to leave pain untreated in
laboratory animals?
Despite advances in the development of alternatives to using
animals in research, scientists still often cite a need to use live
animals in experiments. Once that need has been confirmed by
funding agencies and/or the local IACUC (Institutional Animal
Care and Use Committee) or other ethics committee, but before
the research plans are finalized, the potential for animal pain and
distress must be assessed, and plans laid to minimize animal
suffering.
Regulatory concern for the pain of laboratory animals is not
new. In 1970, the United States Congress updated the Animal
Welfare Act (AWA) in calling for ‘‘adequate veterinary care,
including the appropriate use of anesthetic, analgesic or
tranquilizing drugs, when such use would be proper in the
opinion of the attending veterinarian’’ [1]. This policy is echoed in
a 2009 report of the National Academy of Sciences on the pain of
laboratory animals, expanding pain management to a more
generalized obligation than simply an aspect of the veterinarian’s
duties: ‘‘Laboratory animals need not experience substantial or
ongoing pain and . . . prevention and alleviation of pain is an
ethical imperative’’ [2]. The eighth edition of the Guide for the Care
and Use of Laboratory Animals similarly states that ‘‘institutions are
expected to provide oversight of all research animals and ensure
that pain and distress are minimized’’ [3].
The ethical principle underlying laboratory animal welfare
policy is that causing pain and distress to sentient animals is
permissible, but requires strong justification [4]. It is a nuanced
norm: causing pain is not categorically prohibited; it is allowed
only with the justification that a valuable scientific experiment
requires that animal pain be left untreated. Taking laboratory
animal pain seriously does not equate to demonstrating a zero
tolerance for animal pain.
Without question, present public policy allows humans to cause
laboratory animals unalleviated pain. The AWA, the Guide for the
Care and Use of Laboratory Animals, and current Public Health Service
policy all allow for the conduct of what are often called ‘‘Category
E’’ studies – experiments in which animals are expected to
undergo significant pain or distress that will be left untreated
because treatments for pain would be expected to interfere with
the experiment [3], [5], [6]. One example among many would be
studies of new painkillers for arthritis, in which a control cohort of
animals are left untreated, while the experimental groups receive
the test painkillers (which themselves may prove not to give pain
relief).
But how are we to determine when to allow these experiments,
or what limits to set on them? To move the mandate for ‘‘pain
management when possible’’ from platitude to real-world
guidance on difficult decisions requires carefully engaging the
question of Category E experiments.
In this paper we assume that animal research will continue into
the foreseeable future and that if regulations remain largely as they
are, there will be times when scientists, veterinarians, and the local
IACUC will agree that some pain will be left untreated. We discuss
how that commonly happens, how things have changed over the
years since the publication of Russell and Burch’s seminal work,
and close with some suggestions on how the process might be
improved.
Analysis
Current American policy and practice
In 1959, William Russell and Rex Burch laid out their
framework for identifying and then reducing ‘‘inhumanity’’ in
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may be a direct result of experimentation (e.g., some studies of
pain may require pain to be inflicted), or it may be ‘‘contingent,’’
incidental to the study but not required for it (e.g., studies of
advanced cancer may focus on finding cures, but maintaining
animals with advanced cancer may mean that animals are in pain
– almost by accident – that is in no way required for the
experiment).
Clearly, the animals do not know whether the source of their
pain is ‘‘direct’’ or ‘‘contingent,’’ and, fortuitously, Russell and
Burch’s suggestions apply to both types. Their proposal was to
pursue, when possible, the overlapping ‘‘3Rs’’ of alternatives in
and to the use of laboratory animals: refine animal procedures so
that they cause less pain or distress; reduce the numbers of sentient
animals on projects that can cause pain or distress; and, finally,
replace sentient animals with nonanimals or non-sentient animals
[7]. The 3Rs have been embraced in myriad policies, regulations,
and articles, and they standardize our metric of progress toward
the improved well-being of laboratory animals.
Current American policy and practice comprise two related
norms: 1) causing animals significant pain and distress must be
justified, and 2) causing animals significant pain and distress can be
justified. In brief, a scientist can likely secure IACUC approval to
cause serious pain, with few if any experimental procedures
entirely beyond consideration. But the system is not laissez-faire:
this approval can be gained only after strong justification and
consideration of alternatives has been presented to the IACUC
[8].
In 1985, the United States Interagency Research Animal
Committee published its Principles for the Utilization and Care of
Vertebrate Animals Used in Testing, Research, and Training (‘‘the
Principles’’) [9]. The Public Health Service Policy on Humane
Care and Use of Laboratory Animals and the AWA, the two main
federal laws governing the care and use of laboratory animals,
both hew closely to the Principles [6], [10].
The key precepts relevant to animal pain that are set forth in the
Principles, as well as the two federal laws, include the following:
N Assume that what is painful to people is painful to animals;
N Avoid or minimize discomfort, distress, and pain when
consistent with sound scientific practices; and
N Withhold tranquilizers, anesthesia, analgesia, or euthanasia
only when scientifically necessary for only the necessary period
of time.
Note that the Principles calls for scientists to minimize animal
pain while at the same time allowing painful studies to be
performed.
Note also, as has been discussed in detail by the present author
(L.C.) elsewhere, the implicit principle that ‘‘pain counts; death
doesn’t’’ [11]. In brief, rather than death being treated as a harm
to animals that must be minimized, death and killing instead exist
in policy as the ultimate painkiller: not killing animals, at least, not
killing animals in pain, is what requires justification. This principle
is in fact crucial to the ethical justification of current practices in
animal research. Killing, or euthanasia, is both a primary strategy
for managing pain for many animals, especially those on chronic
studies, and the fate of the overwhelming majority of laboratory
animals, whether they are in sickness or in health.
Cancer pain is an exemplar. Virtually every human cancer is
modeled in animals, and as in people, some cancers (such as oral
and bone cancers) appear to be quite painful, even in their early
stages. They can likewise be quite resistant to painkillers. In
humans and companion animals, chronic cancer pain manage-
ment includes progressively more aggressive opioid treatment with
the most potent opioids (pure mu agonists such as fentanyl and
morphine) [12]. Successful pain treatment can require an
intravenous catheter for round-the-clock medication. This would
be an extremely unlikely and challenging management strategy for
rodents on cancer studies. Add to this that many pain drugs can
have at least some effect on the progression of these cancers, and
therefore might confound the research data [13], [14]. For these
reasons, euthanasia is the main pain management strategy for such
experiments.
Application of animal welfare policy is placed at the level of the
institution, rather than on individuals in the institution. Whereas
1970 AWA provisions placed animal pain management within the
provision of ‘‘adequate veterinary care’’ under the jurisdiction of
the facility veterinarian, the 1985 amendment, still in force in
2011, shifted jurisdiction. While the researcher must consult with a
veterinarian in planning potentially painful studies, it is now the
IACUC (on which the veterinarian is one voting member) that
reviews and approves or rejects a researcher’s justifications for not
treating animal pain. This decentralized decision-making is subject
to some oversight – by the United States Department of
Agriculture if the research involves the species they cover, by the
Association for the Assessment and Accreditation of Laboratory
Animal Care (AAALAC) in those facilities that voluntarily seek its
accreditation, or by the National Institutes of Health’s Office of
Laboratory Animal Welfare (for institutions that receive Public
Health Service funding).
Thus, current public policy clearly allows for harmful uses of
laboratory animals. It nonetheless pushes scientists to take
seriously Russell and Burch’s ‘‘three Rs’’: refinement, reduction,
and replacement [7]. However, the ‘‘when scientifically necessary’’
clauses of current policy do not require that all procedures be fully
refined such that laboratory animals will not suffer pain or distress,
they do not call for reduction to zero of animal use in painful
experiments, and they do not call for complete replacement of
sentient animals with other models.
Progress in finding alternatives in animal research
How can we measure progress toward a goal of no unnecessary
animal pain, or how can we meet the far bigger challenge: no pain
or suffering at all for laboratory animals?
In practice, in reviewing proposals to use animals, IACUCs
consider what pain is likely to occur and what plans are laid out to
prevent, minimize, or treat it. Although the deliberations of
IACUCs are mostly internal affairs, they are publicly reflected in
annual reports to the USDA. The most recent of these, labeled
‘‘Annual Reports of Enforcement,’’ are available online at the
USDA’s Animal Care Web site. USDA has been collecting these
reports since 1971, and therefore could be a powerful resource for
tracking progress over the years [15], [16].
Inspection of the USDA’s on-line annual reports for 2002–2009
indicate that, very roughly, 7–9% of all animals used in research,
teaching, or testing are reported in Category E, i.e., they are used
on studies in which pain or distress are left untreated because
painkillers would affect the data being collected. The pattern
appears to be that the numbers are going down, from
approximately 100,000 ten and more years ago to approximately
76,000 in 2008 and 2009 [17].
One might assess progress toward a goal of zero animal pain by
studying these trends in the USDA reports, but several factors
make this presently impossible. First, the reports cover only AWA-
covered species, a tiny fraction of the animals used in research (the
author of the present article estimates that the AWA covers less
than 1% of research mammals, as laboratory-bred mice and rats
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reporting requirements). Available evidence does not allow us to
know whether the (mostly larger) species covered by the AWA
accurately reflect the fate of laboratory rats and mice. For
example, if the vast majority of animal studies of cancer or pain
are performed in small rodents, those entire areas of research are
largely invisible to the AWA and its annual reports.
Further frustrating a longitudinal assessment of USDA’s data
are inconsistencies in reporting. For example, during some
years, until USDA clarified that they should not do this, some
facilities reported their numbers for rats and mice, while others
did not. Far more significant is the fact that Category E
standards have changed over the decades. Years ago, if an
animal underwent surgery with a general anesthetic, followed
by no postoperative pain medication, she/he might be reported
in Category D (in which potentially painful procedures are
treated with painkillers). This would in fact be keeping with the
standard of care in veterinary practice of the day, in which
post-operative analgesics were not standard for dog or cat spays
or many other surgeries [18]. By today’s standards, although
t h es a m ea n e s t h e t i c sm i g h tb eu s e d ,i ft h e r ei sn of o l l o w - o n
analgesic treatment, many institutions would place these
animals in Category E.
This evolution of what counts as a Category E procedure may
reflect changed mores about animal pain, but these changing
mores have happened contemporaneously with changes in the
available information. Methods of pain diagnosis continue to
evolve, as do the available medications for treating pain.
The USDA data combine pain and distress, and so it is
impossible to sort out those animals who experience distress
without pain. For example, studies that induce fear, though with
no pain inflicted, could be reported in Category E.
There is a threshold question in placing animals in Category E.
Minor, short-duration pain (think of a flu vaccine) would not
generally call for use of painkillers, and would not put an
experiment in Category E if painkillers were not administered.
The threshold for distress is provided by example. A low threshold
of food deprivation—‘‘Food and/or water deprivation or restric-
tion beyond that necessary for normal presurgical preparation,’’ or
about six to 10 hours—could put an experiment into Category E
[19].
Thus, by today’s standards for both pain and distress, the
USDA Category E numbers from previous decades should be
much higher than actually reported at the time. If the numbers of
Category E animals are slowly decreasing, while the threshold for
Category E has been lowered, that might well mean that the
amount of significant pain in AWA-covered animals is in fact
decreasing. As noted, we do not have good data to determine how
the numbers reported for AWA-covered species reflect the fate of
laboratory mice and rats,
Another source of data on trends in pain and pain management
is examination of published experimental reports. In one such
survey, Richardson and coworkers found relatively low use of
animal analgesics being reported, but 4 years later a similar survey
by Stokes and colleagues found an increase [14], [15]. The
limitation of these reports, and of future follow-on studies faithfully
using their methods, is determining whether painkillers were used
and not reported, or not used at all.
To be clear, not every experiment is painful. Further, not every
painful experience, at least in humans, is painful enough to
warrant the use of painkillers. Thus, two important questions arise:
1) are animals getting enough pain management to keep them out
of significant pain, and 2) if they are not, is their pain truly limited
to what is scientifically necessary? Asking whether laboratory
animals should get more pain medication requires looking at some
facts about the management of animal pain and further probing
values about the use of animals in laboratories.
Facts and values in animal ethics
Case 1. Researcher G wants to model myocardial infarction
(MI) in mice to explore whether a proposed treatment with muscle
growth factors has promise for humans suffering an MI, or ‘‘heart
attack.’’ An MI is surgically induced in mice by opening the chest
and tying off a coronary artery so that a section of heart muscle
loses its blood supply in a manner roughly comparable to the way
that clots choke the blood supply to human heart muscle during a
spontaneous MI. The question is: how much of which painkillers
should these mice receive?
In cases like this it seems useful to identify the relevant facts
(empirical claims) and values to reach a normative (‘‘what ought
we do’’) conclusion or prescription (see box):
Making a Decision: Facts + Values R Prescriptions
The facts. The values of respecting animal suffering underlie
the public policy to treat animal pain whenever possible. This case
study illustrates the application of that principle, and the need to
clarify the facts, and to further refine the values.
For this study, we can list several questions of fact that need
answers before we can prescribe a treatment regimen, including:
N Can mice feel pain?
N How much does chest surgery hurt the mouse?
N Is acute ischemia (a ‘‘heart attack’’) painful in mice?
N What signs might mice exhibit when they are feeling pain?
N What analgesics can successfully treat the pain? At what dose
and frequency?
N How will pain medications affect the heart data being
collected?
N How will untreated pain affect the heart data being collected?
N How well do studies on mice model a human MI?
N What side effects on mouse health do the painkillers cause?
Some of the fact-questions have clear and simple answers, but
often the answers are unknown (as when talking about the inner
feelings of mice, especially of various genetically modified strains of
mice). Or, the answers might best be expressed probabilistically
(x% of mice will experience significant pain with this surgery; y %
of mice will benefit from three times daily buprenorphine pain
medicine), probabilities that may vary with mouse strain, skill of
operator, or other factors [20].
Ethical decision-making: facts plus values. Answers to
these fact-questions can help us decide how to proceed – if a
mouse MI does not faithfully model the corresponding event in
humans, there is no justification for the study; if mice do not feel
pain from the procedure, there is no need to worry about
painkillers. The facts alone are insufficient to answer the
normative question. If mice feel pain, but one’s values exclude
moral concern for murine pain, then Dr. G may continue
unencumbered. On the other hand, if mice feel pain, but there is
no moral justification to cause others (here, mice) pain, then Dr. G
cannot do the study.
In the simplest case, the painkillers have no [known] effect on
the experimental data. Dr. G has an obligation to give her mice
analgesics to the extent her veterinarian can recommend safe and
effective medications. How much expense must she incur if the
medicines are costly? How much inconvenience, if they require
midnight re-dosing to get a mouse comfortably through the night?
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single pain. But in making these decisions for animals who have no
liberty to avoid the experiment or to self-medicate, researchers
must be vigilant in determining how much their own convenience,
their own failure to see the animals’ pain, or their failure to
adequately research concerns about experimental outcomes can
lead to undertreatment of animal pain.
Dr. G has no desire for the mice to be in pain, and she may not balk
at the cost or inconvenience of pain drugs. She wants to see whether
muscle growth factor works in a beating heart as it did in heart cells in
her lab. But she also knows that the common classes of analgesic drugs
– opioids like morphine and nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drugs
(NSAIDs) like ibuprofen – have effects throughout the body, and she
fears their use will cloud her interpretation of the data. If the growth
factor failed to work, could it be simply that the NSAID was to blame?
Did she ruin her experiment in following her veterinarian’s pain
management recommendations?
Animal studies have an advantage over human studies in their
ability to control so many extraneous sources of variability in the
data. For many scientists (hence the number of Category E studies
being done), experiments may seem ‘tainted’ when excess drugs,
such as NSAIDs, are used. A new report from the National
Academy of Sciences, however, puts this concern in a different
perspective: ‘‘In studies where the use of certain analgesics appears
to be contraindicated, investigators should be mindful that
unwanted variables from pain-induced perturbation of homeo-
static mechanisms can affect the animal model’’ [2]. In other
words: do not eliminate painkillers as sources of unwanted
variability without carefully assessing the effects of pain itself.
Less obvious, perhaps, are the effects that pain could have on
efforts to model human disease. We know that human MIs are not
caused by doing open-chest surgery, and we also know that a
surgical MI in the mouse will release a host of inflammatory
mediators, and these will lead to pain. Furthermore, the pain of a
chest incision may make breathing more difficult, and the
decreased ventilation could create various research artifacts. In
addition, pain may make animals less likely to eat and drink – how
might this affect the heart’s response to the experimental growth
factors in a metabolically challenged animal?
Saving a principle such as ‘‘treat animal pain when possible’’ from
sitting in a frame on the wall as a hollow platitude requires quantification.
The facts must be quantified: how much pain? How much of an effect
of pain, or of painkillers, on data? And the values must be quantified:
how much pain warrants how much cost, inconvenience, and what
limits to pain treatment do various research projects merit?
Importantly, normative decisions on how to proceed in the face of
uncertain or probabilistic information must be made explicit.
To sum up, facts and values must be used together to make
prescriptions, but the process is by no means straightforward.
Different investigators, and different IACUCs, will differ on how
they treat the prospect of pain in laboratory animals.
Results and Discussion
Moving forward: some suggestions
How should we move toward a goal of less and less laboratory
animal pain? Following are some possibilities, some more realistic
than others, and some more research friendly than others.
1) Include fuller information in the literature. The
USDA has stated its belief (with no evidence provided, however)
‘‘that the performance of a database search remains the most
effective and efficient method for demonstrating compliance with
the requirement to consider alternatives to painful/distressful
procedures’’ [19]. That may one day be true, but for now it is
hampered by the lack of animal-welfare-relevant information in too
many research articles. For example, a recent literature review
indicated that in 2006, less than 5% of mouse research articles and
27%ofprimateresearcharticlesreportedontheimplementation(or
justification for non-use) of painkillers [21]. These results suggest
that the USDA’s assertion may be of little value to researchers.
This may and should change. The new ‘‘ARRIVE Guidelines’’
for publishing animal studies do recommend that details of
anesthesia and analgesia be published in any animal studies [22].
Guidelines under development by the National Academy of
Sciences will likely cover this as well [23]. Until the information is
in the literature, however, a simple literature search, even with the
term alternatives included, will not truly meet the informational
needs of scientists, IACUCs, and veterinarians.
2) Search better for information. Until the formal
literature is far richer in detail on the management of animal
pain in experiments, researchers and veterinarians need to look
more broadly for information on alternatives. Various commercial
search engines may pick up information missed by PubMed and
the like, and list-serves for scientists and laboratory animal care
specialists are useful for anecdotal information and experience.
Cross-talk between the laboratory animal care community and the
scientists they serve is essential.
3) Generate better data. Refining animal research requires
far more data on pain recognition in assorted species that we may
find hard to ‘‘read,’’ such as mice, birds, frogs, and fish.
Developing this knowledge, i.e., doing the pain research on
these species, without causing the very pain we are still learning to
read is a significant ethical challenge. We can add to this our need
for more information on safe and effective pain medications at the
right dose and frequency for these animals, and for data on how
pain and painkillers both affect various research models.
Guidelines on pain studies in animals are available to minimize,
but not totally eliminate, the pain caused to the animals [24].
4) Clarify what it means to ‘‘affect the model.’’. As more
is learned both about the far-reaching effects of various drugs
throughout the body and the far-reaching effects of pain and
distress on immune function, behavior, cancer biology, and more,
clear thinking on how to balance these unwanted variables is
needed. The simplistic approach is to look at the different
outcomes (e.g., in cancer metastasis) of using an analgesic versus
not using one in an experiment, and if any difference is found, to
decide that the analgesic introduces extraneous variability and
must be banished [25]. But if pain-treated and pain-untreated
animals have different outcomes, is it not just as plausible that their
pain is the source of artifact? Certainly, scientists should be
absolutely clear about just what it is they are modeling before
ruling out painkillers in their experiments. Working against this
principle, alas, is the legitimate desire to tie ongoing work as
closely as possible to that which has preceded it, to allow better
comparison of findings. Staff turnover and changes in housing,
animal genetics, and the availability of various medications are all
potential sources of difference between prior work and future
work, and against this backdrop, introducing the use of painkillers
combined with good use of control subjects may become an
acceptable refinement, even at the risk of diminished comparison
with historical information. As noted above, and in the National
Academy of Sciences publication, no researcher should rule out
painkillers in her studies without having carefully investigated the
effect of pain itself on her research model.
5) Change the standard of care in use of analgesics. Like
analgesics, anesthetics have wide-ranging and long-lasting effects on
the animal as a research model. And yet, it is virtually unheard of to
allow surgical procedures without anesthesia. Judicious use of
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anesthetic can minimize the amount of variability and artifact that
anesthetics may cause in an experiment. The rest of the anesthetic’s
effect must simply be accommodated in a world in which surgery
without anesthesia is all but banned. Use of painkillers after surgery
or for ongoing pain has not universally achieved that status in
animal research, but one day it may well do so. Currently,
researchers may justify withholding peri-operative analgesics out of
concern for their effects on the model, and receive approval to do
such Category E studies. An alternative standard would be to
require some post-operative pain management, just as intra-
operative anesthesia is now near-universally required, recognizing
that some effect on the experiment is likely.
6) Continue to develop ethical standards in IACUC
review. The American system is decentralized, with authority
vested in local IACUCs. On some issues, the IACUC may find little
guidance, and different IACUCs may therefore develop quite
different standards. As consensus emerges, or contentious issues are
brought to the regulators’ attention, guidance (or regulation) becomes
more explicit. For example, there exists a tension between the ‘‘two
R’s’’ of reduction and refinement: is it better to usemore animalswith
less pain or distress per animal (possibly a refinement), or to reduce
numbers of animals by imposing more on each animal [26]? The
2011 Guide attempts to promote inter-institutional consistency and
ethical clarity to this, in stating ‘‘reduction should not be a rationale
for reusing an animal or animals that have already undergone
experimental procedures especially if the well-being of the animals
would be compromised’’ [3].
7) Set limits on animal suffering by discipline. Presently,
in theory at least, granting agencies disperse finite research funds to
none but the best proposals. Society sets the limits, through donations
to funding organizations, through government funding agencies, or
through market-driven pharmaceuticals research. Disciplines or fields
of inquiry compete amongst each other, uncommon non-life-
threatening illnesses receiving much less funding than widespread
serious illnesses. By contrast, IACUC approvals are in theory,
unlimited. Would it be possible to reframe ‘‘permission to cause
animal pain’’ as a finite resource that would be limited by discipline
[27]? It is an intriguing concept, but presently unfeasible, in the
present author’s assessment, if only because we cannot measure
cumulative animal pain in quanta that are nearly so clear as
measuring research dollars. For now, the indirect way in which ‘‘pain
per discipline’’ is limited is through limitations in funding.
8) Pledge to end animal pain and distress. The Humane
Society of the United States has an ongoing campaign urging
colleges and universities to pledge to allow no severe unalleviated
pain or distress in laboratory animals [28]. This pledge goes
beyond federal policy that requires justifying untreated pain in
Category E studies to actually banning it. There may be some
word parsing, however: if Category E studies allow ‘‘more than
minor or momentary’’ pain or distress, perhaps only a subset of
these crosses the Humane Society’s ‘‘severe’’ threshold. Even so,
there may be some lines of inquiry, or, at least, some types of
experiments, that would simply have to be set aside for this pledge
to be honored. Animal studies of the mechanisms of the intense
pain of advanced cancer, for instance, would seem to be off-limits,
however beneficial for patients solving the problem of cancer pain
would be. Full implementation of the pledge, banning what we
would call ‘‘Category E-plus’’ research no matter the hoped-for
benefits, would surely require a societal (and probably, regulatory)
shift.
9) Develop better reporting of ‘‘pain categories’’ in
animal use. The USDA developed its system of reporting pain
and distress in animals in 1971, with a goal of tracking progress
toward full implementation of the 3 Rs [29]. Unclear definitions,
shifting standards, and exclusion of the overwhelming majority of
laboratory animals have limited the usefulness of these annual
reports. A broader scale, better identifying studies presentlyon the D–
E cusp, or establishing a new category of ‘‘E-plus’’ severe pain studies,
applied to all research vertebrates, would improve this system.
Conclusion
If present trends continue within laboratory animal science, the
advent of new technologies will refine the use of animals in studies,
reduce their numbers, and move us closer to large-scale
replacement. Better recognition of pain and improved treatments
should lead to less pain. Including fuller detail of animal pain
management practices in the scientific literature will better
disseminate information on ‘‘best practices’’ and elevate the
standard of laboratory animal care. Better and fuller factual data
onanimalpain recognitionandtreatment will allowclearerfocuson
the ethical questions, which require attention both to fact and value.
Good people can place different values on the need to avoid animal
suffering, the need to promote medical progress, and where to place
the benefit of the doubt when the facts are not entirely known or
outcomes entirely predictable. Despite progress, a goal of zero
unalleviated laboratory animal pain could be achieved in the near
future only by deciding to abandon some types of animal studies.
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